2013年11月28日 星期四

老闆睇你唔順眼6種表現‏

My friend sent me this article today @ November 22, 2013

「老闆」,可能是世界上最難服侍的生物。你「順毛梳」,他不是嫌你隨波逐流,就是發晦氣說「請你返嚟係想你畀啲新思維我地」;你一言九「頂」,他就說你社交障礙養不熟。打工仔個個日日微臣惶恐,到底是不是這樣的老闆才會這樣的不妥我?

高深莫測的老闆喜怒不形於色,破口大罵未必是針對,而笑口噬噬亦不一定就歡喜。佢鍾意我?佢唔順超我?與其摘花瓣問卜,倒不如確切留意一下他對你的反常態度或行動,出現以下情況的話,身為打工仔的你就要「睇路」︰

1/ 當你妹仔咁使
無論是斟茶遞水,還是將衣物拿去洗衣舖乾洗,老闆都欽賜你全權負責。有可能因為他對你全然信任,毫無芥蒂;但若然堂堂Manager卻只被委派去做此等芝麻綠豆事,而公事上卻謝絕染指,那麼他不是看你不順眼,就是睇你唔上眼(私人褓母等除外)。

2/ 當眾侮辱你
做錯事,被罵被批評就當袋錢落袋,同一個錯誤不要錯超過一次,不過前提是光明磊落。尖酸刻薄的用字,人家私底下分享就當眼不見為淨;但當眾侮辱,有理或無理都No way。不是叫你去以牙還牙、對罵或單打,而是要在適當的時候說不,保護自己。施虐者固然無品,而受虐一方選擇默默承受的話,就別抱怨個天虧欠你。

3/ 雞蛋裡面挑骨頭
錯!唔係咁!改咗佢!又錯!都話唔係咁!再改!又係錯!唔要!……一份簡單文件改到ver.155.4.12.24.9.521,除了「錯」和「再做」之外,老闆再沒有提出比較不虛的實質評語或指引,即使他沒有睇你唔順眼,相信你亦不會頂得順吧!

4/ 將你拒諸門外
當老闆下旨,一切會議你行人止步、所有文件對你來說都highly confidential、任何議案你都無得Say no……你就知道,他有幾不想將你見到。點算?先自我檢討,然後找個中間人坦誠地談談,見步行步。不然,hea下去亦沒意思。

5/ 唔使你做嘢
別以為老闆大幅減少你的工作是愛錫你的表現,老闆不是母親大人,大概不會肉赤你工作辛勞或沒錢開飯。這一刻他唔使你做,是因為以後都唔使你做——你唔使做了。試想想,難道他每個月出糧給你是因為不捨得你捱餓嗎?建議盡量做好手上工作,重建老闆對你的信心。

6/ 你搵佢唔到
比「唔使你做」更高層次,是當你無到。當有人以為老闆「日捽夜捽」、甚麼都要管、甚麼都說行不通很難頂的時候,一山還有一山高——完全無feedback,十問九唔應,甚至早一個月約他開會,他總諸多推搪或臨時「甩底」。身為打工仔,要不想辦法「破冰」,要不自求多福。

死啦死啦!唔通老闆真係唔鍾意我?稍安勿躁,一個人無論如何都不能討好所有人,做好件事,對得住天地對得起自己,比甚麼都重要。捱過這一關,就當是磨練。世事很奇妙,你口口聲聲說捱不住了,捱下捱下,原來已經不知不覺到山頂,另有一番景象。

一句講晒︰不管老闆嫌不嫌棄你,打工仔都要記住,天生我才必有用,每個人都有可取的地方。不要否定自己,先評估一下老闆的「不順眼」來得有沒有道理。有道理的話,就爭取機會鞭策自己,跌下就識行;無理取鬧或純粹一男(女)子因素的話,大可以講聲多謝,然後抽身byebye。沒必要動氣,亦沒有傷心的餘地。人夾人緣,這個老闆夾不來,就找另一個。留得熱血在,那怕無工返。

PS︰老闆呀老闆,員工是你雪亮的眼睛請回來的,要他們更上進,不必下下採取高壓手段。要大家天天驚弓之鳥般開工,何苦? 

2013年11月21日 星期四

I-Bank Reality

Read this on Bloomberg today... I like the perspective of the author = )
 
McKinsey Tells Banks to Focus on Making Money

One of my great skills as an investment banker was saying no. Clients or other bankers would come to me and say "oh, can we do this ridiculous thing?" and I would say "no" or "no you dummy" or "that's a really interesting idea, let me take it back to my team," or whatever the context-appropriate version of "no" was. And then the ridiculous idea would never darken my door again and I could get back to the important business of pitching people on my ridiculous ideas.
This, it turns out, is not a universally valued skill in investment banking. There are good reasons for that. For one thing, most of the money in investment banking has historically been made by going and doing ridiculous-sounding things. "What if we packaged mortgages into bonds?," someone once said. The success rate is low, but the rewards to success are high, so you take every opportunity seriously even if it's pretty stupid.

For another thing, investment banking has a … culture. A culture of punching yourself in the face for client-service and looking-busy reasons, mostly.2 That's why bankers work 120 hours a week and are on call all the time: because if a client wants something, you drop everything and get it to her as quickly as possible and in a way that exceeds her expectations. "Where did my stock close today?," a CEO will ask, and two minutes later you'll email her back a 20-page presentation with charts of her stock's performance, comparisons to her peers, and an LBO analysis. And she'll be like "umm thanks I guess, I just wanted the price really, but I see it's in here."

Obviously, you will not charge her for this presentation. The idea is that by punching yourself in the face frequently and enthusiastically for the client, you will earn her respect and/or pity, and she will one day hire you to do a fairly simple thing like manage her initial public offering. Then she will pay you an amount of money that is (1) quite large and (2) entirely unrelated to the difficulty or effort of managing the IPO. You're not really getting paid for the IPO, though; you're getting paid for the relationship.
That's the model -- do a lot of pointless work and occasionally have it pay off massively. Anything you do for any client can be justified as relationship-building. "Well but they've literally never paid us a penny in the entire 10 years we've been calling on them." "Yes but that's because the relationship wasn't strong enough!" Etc.
So if you went to the typical senior investment banker and asked him, "would you prioritize providing high-value services to top-tier clients, or high-value services to second-tier clients, or low-value services to top-tier clients, or low-value services to second-tier clients," he would say "Yes!" and think himself pretty clever. And if you asked him, "should we do any sort of rigorous data-driven analysis of which of the services we're offering are actually profitable for us," he'd say "yes, you should absolutely do that, have it on my desk by morning, but don't expect us to actually stop doing any services just because they're unprofitable."
I have mixed feelings about this McKinsey report on global banking! McKinsey is after all McKinsey, not a bank, and so its people are pretty into things like efficiency and telling other companies how to run their businesses, and less into things like doing tons of uncompensated work. (Except this report I mean.) They are worried about the large global capital-markets banks, whose return on equity is below their cost of capital and getting lower. And their advice is in part: Maybe you should think about what you're doing instead of just, y'know, doing all of everything.
So the report says that "scarce resources" should be "allocated to the clients that have the potential to generate attractive returns," with less focus on clients who don't, y'know, pay. "Less focus" not just in the sense of "work for those clients between 1 and 4 a.m."; "less focus" in the sense of call centers:
This means migrating clients to full electronic platforms where possible, experimenting with in- and out-bound call centers in lower-cost near-shore locations for client-facing sales, and restricting RWA and balance-sheet allocation.
I will not opine on the feasibility of replacing bond salesmen with an 800 number to a "lower-cost near-shore location," but I suspect it'd be bad for morale.
They have a similar view on product proliferation:
For example, banks often offer multiple minor variations of the same product, designed to attract marginal income in a particular asset class or to cater to a specific client. These products often do not attract enough volume to justify their cost.

Banks must initially undertake a one-off simplification and rationalization exercise, with a view to cutting out dead wood and reducing costs. For example, the ongoing standardization of OTC derivatives provides a great opportunity to drastically simplify the product set in that space. This effort should start with liquid rates products in the United States. For bespoke and complex products, a better understanding is required of front-to-back economics through the lifecycle before a decision is made on whether the products make economic sense.
So what do you think? On the one hand, just yesterday I was defending the irrational in finance. Efficiency and profitability and ROE are fine for consultants, but global banks answer to a higher authority. That higher authority being "do crazy stuff because maybe it's good for the economy somehow," I don't know. But also: What is the point of working in finance if it isn't fun?3 Getting a better understanding of front-to-back economics through the life cycle before pitching a crazy new product does not seem fun.
On the other hand, it's hard to say that McKinsey is wrong here. In particular the last few years have seen a number of large global banks scaling back their focus on doing everything for everyone, with JPMorgan getting out of student loans, UBS  scaling back investment banking, and Morgan Stanley shifting toward asset management. Presumably those decisions are driven by sober, serious, post-bubble reflection about what businesses at what banks can earn their cost of capital.
Most interesting, though, might be Goldman Sachs's decision -- which, sure, I have gently mocked -- to tell junior bankers to go home sometimes. Whatever this decision says about falling deal volumes or recruiting competition, it marks a big cultural shift simply by telling bankers that sometimes it's okay to say no: that the way to evaluate an assignment is "is it necessary?" or "is it profitable?" rather than just "did someone ask me to do it?" And that cultural shift seems to be in the air: Goldman is trying to answer those questions for its analysts and associates just as McKinsey is suggesting that the big banks need to start asking those questions for themselves. 

2013年11月5日 星期二

Perfect Job at Google?

Read this online today @ Nov 6, 2013

筍工反叫苦 員工數Google六罪

Google向以人工高、福利好見稱,更五度蟬聯人力資源公司Universum的「全球五十大最具吸引力僱主」榜首,是大學生夢寐以求的筍工,但多名前員工在網誌Quora抱怨公司福利,力數Google六宗「罪」。

罪狀一 免費食物太多
曾在班加羅爾辦公室工作的前員工留言,指「任職期間足足胖了十八公斤。」雖然辦公室設健身室,但食物無處不在,令他們於沉悶或思考時,不自覺愈吃愈多。化名拉基的前員工則指,大多數人也會增磅五至十五磅。

罪狀二 按摩椅太吵
有匿名人士表示,蘇黎世辦公室設有員工休息室,但「有過百封投訴電郵要求移走那裏的按摩椅,因為按摩椅太嘈,令他們睡不着。」

罪狀三 難找安靜地方
公司的開放式設計,亦令員工難找到獨立空間或辦公室,安靜地自己進行工作或思考。

罪狀四 工作欠挑戰性
這是最常見的投訴,「糖衣裏包着的是沉悶工作和欠缺發揮機會。」最需要用腦的時候,卻只是於見工時。

罪狀五 員工太優秀
由於Google人才濟濟,即使是哈佛大學等名校畢業生,也只能擔任普通工作,甚至難獲晉升機會。

罪狀六 新人要拍馬屁
皮爾指,新人會被稱為「New Googler」或「Newgler」。要打成一片,需事無大小也要興奮歡呼,當上司進入會議室時暗叫「whoops」的人。

2013年11月4日 星期一

西柚減肥餐單

日本醫院*減肥*餐單 日本減肥法, 二星期內減10kg

第一天

早餐﹕熟蛋一隻、西柚一個、方飽一塊、茶
午餐﹕熟蛋一隻、蕃茄一個、茶
晚餐﹕豆腐,(青瓜、紅蘿蔔、西芹等做成醋味沙律)、茶


第二天

早餐﹕熟蛋一隻、西柚一個、方飽一塊、茶
午餐﹕熟蛋一隻、西柚一個、茶
晚餐﹕牛排,(蕃茄、西芹等做成的醋味沙律)、茶


第三天

早餐﹕熟蛋一隻、西柚一個、方飽一塊、茶
午餐﹕蔬菜沙律、西柚一個、方飽一塊、茶
晚餐﹕豆腐,燒雞,(蕃茄、西芹等做成醋味沙律),茶


第四天

早餐﹕熟蛋一隻、西柚一個、方飽一塊、茶
午餐﹕蔬菜沙律、西柚一個、方飽一塊、茶
晚餐﹕豆腐,芝士,菠菜,茶


第五天

早餐﹕熟蛋一隻、西柚一個、方飽一塊、茶
午餐﹕熟蛋一隻、菠菜,方飽一塊,茶
晚餐﹕魚,菠菜沙律,方飽二塊,茶


第六天

早餐﹕熟蛋一隻、西柚一個、方飽一塊、茶
午餐﹕生果,菜用罐頭,茶
晚餐﹕牛排,(蕃茄、西芹等做成的醋味沙律)、茶


第七天

早餐﹕熟蛋一隻、西柚一個、方飽一塊、茶
午餐﹕凍燒雞,蕃茄,西柚一個,茶
晚餐﹕蔬菜湯,燒雞,蕃茄,椰菜,西芹等,西柚一個,茶


日本國立醫院的減肥方法

這減肥餐在二星期內將體內組織經化學變化而起作用,食量多少全無關係,但必須嚴守食譜內指定的食物進食,因事故中途停企時請再從新進行,為期二星期,可減至10kg,完成這減肥方法後因體內組織已變化,除了必需的營養外對多餘的物質不會吸收,增肥的機會減少,只要減少進食殿粉質食物便會控制體重。


注意事項

1. 沙律中不能加沙律醬或有油的調味料,蔬菜最好煮熟加豉油或醋
2. 菜或咖啡不能加糖,奶
3. 肉類可燒或煮熟,不能用油
4. 魚可食魚生或蒸或煮
5. 盡量少用鹽調味(為了不能飲大量水,八杯內)
6.
雞約雞脾一隻,牛肉約80-200g(每個人7安士
)
7.
雞蛋要全熟,二個亦可

8. 任何調味都不能加糖,以淡味為主,避免多渴水
9. 方飽的厚一塊20mm
10.
可做大菜糕來頂肚餓或香口膠(無糖
)
備註﹕早晚必須記載體重,就算數日毫無成績亦不用心急,十日後必有驚人的效果。